If Judgement Is Voided Can Case Be Tried Again
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. L-2233 April 25, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO TAMAYO, defendant-appellant.Leandro G. Rafales for appellant.
Starting time Banana Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.TUASON, J.:
Timoteo Tamayo, the appellant, was charged in the Courtroom of Beginning Instance of Ilocos Norte with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, upon an data of the post-obit tenor:
That on or about Baronial 17, 1946, at the municipality of Solsona, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, the said defendant did and so and in that location willfully, unlawfully, and criminally take in his possession and under his custody and control ane United states of america carbine Cal. 30 Serial No. 1561754 and 5 magazines with 116 rounds of ammunitions without permission to concur same.
On July 16, 1947, the defendant, assisted past counsel, pleaded guilty, whereupon the court, taking into consideration said plea of guilty and the recommendation of the fiscal, sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 and costs. Upon petition of his attorney, the accused was given one month within which to pay the fine.
On July 24, 1947, the Provincial Fiscal moved the court to reconsider its decision on the basis that the imposable penalty was that provided in Republic Human activity No. 4, which became constructive on July nineteen, 1946. Evidently when the case was tried and determination rendered, neither the court, the financial nor the accused was aware of the enactment of the new law, which considerably increased the penalisation for the possession, etc., of firearms and ammunition.
The defendant'south counsel objected to the motion for afterthought. Nonetheless, the court, on February 14, 1948, amended its decision and sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment, accessories of the police force, and costs.
The question for decision is whether the court below had jurisdiction to modify its decision afterwards the lapse of about seven months from the engagement of its promulgation, notwithstanding the fact that the financial's motion for reconsideration was filed within fifteen days. The appellant says no, and the Solicitor General agrees with him, recommending that the amended decision "be declared zilch and void."
Section seven of Rule 116 of the Rules of Courtroom provides:
SEC. seven. Modification of judgment. � A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering information technology before the judgment has get final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the flow for perfecting an entreatment, or when the judgement has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the accused has expressly waived in writing his right to entreatment.
Sections one and 6 of Rule 118 provide:
SECTION i. Appeal. � From all concluding judgments of the Court of Beginning Instance or courts of like jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court equally hereinafter prescribed.
SEC. half dozen. When appeal to be taken. � An appeal must be taken within xv days from the rendition of the judgment or order appealed from. This menstruum for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motility for new trial is filed until notice of the club overruling the move shall have been served upon the accused or his attorney.
In U.S. vs. Vayson (27 Phil., 447), this Court went to great length in a give-and-take of the authorisation of the court to alter its judgment and concluded that earlier a judgment becomes final, the trial courtroom has plenary power to alter or revise the same equally law and justice crave. The decision cited, amongst numerous cases, Ex parte Lange (85 U.S., 163; 21 Constabulary. ed., 872), in which the Federal Supreme Courtroom states the general rule: "The full general power of the court over its own judgments, orders and decrees, in both ceremonious and criminal cases, during the beingness of the term to which they are outset fabricated, is undeniable."
But the period at the cease of which a judgment becomes final, which is fifteen days, is never, under any circumstances, suspended except by the filing of a movement for new trial by the defendant nether section 1 of Rule 117.one Earlier the adoption of the Rules of Courtroom non even such motion past the defendant could produce the effect of interrupting the period to appeal. Section one of Rule 117 is new; information technology has no counterpart in the Lawmaking of Criminal Procedure which the Rules of Court have superseded.
In the example of U.S. vs. Flemister (1 Phil., 317), Mr. Justice Willard, speaking for the Court, said:
Our conclusions are (i) that within the xv days allowed for an entreatment the trial courtroom may reopen the case on either of ii grounds; (2) that if the defendant does not appeal he tin can make no motion in this court on either basis; (3) that if he does entreatment he tin can move in this courtroom on either ground. If the defendant make a motion in the lower court and that is denied, he can still appeal if the 15 days allowed therefor take not expired. If the defendant fails to appeal and limits himself to a motion in the trial court to reopen the example, this motion fails if it is not decided inside the non-extendable period of xv days.
The same question was extensively discussed in U.Due south. vs. Court of Commencement Instance (24 Phil., 321), wherein the Flemister case was cited among many others.
If a motion for new trial or reconsideration by the defendant himself could not terminate the running of the catamenia to appeal, salvage for section 1 of Dominion 117, how much less could the prosecution by a motion or otherwise do and so in the absence of a similar provision?
Both the appellant and the Solicitor General concede that under section seven of Dominion 116 a judgment may exist amended within 15 days from the appointment of its promulgation; their objection is that the amendment in this case was made outside that period. Even so, some members of the court believe that without the consent of the defendant a judgment may not at whatsoever fourth dimension be contradistinct beyond the correction of clerical or inadvertent errors. They rely on section ane of Rule 117 for this view.
Other, including the author of this determination, maintain that section 1 of Rule 117 does not control. They are of the opinion that this rule has no bearing on the case at bar; that the applicative rule is section 7 of Dominion 116, and that this rule and Rule 117, section one, relate to different subjects and practice not conflict or interfere with each other. Department 7 of Rule 116 refers to modification of judgment, equally its championship shows, while section one of Rule 117 refers to new trial.
What is a new trial? While "new trial" is a term of wide signification, we think that section 5 of Dominion 117 furnishes a clue to its meaning as the term is employed in Rule 117. Said section 5 is as follows:
SEC. five. Effect of granting a new trial. � The furnishings of granting a new trial are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the basis of errors of constabulary or irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and show non affected by the commission of such errors and irregularities shall stand, but those affected thereby shall be ready aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the basis of newly discovered testify, the prove already taken shall stand up, and the newly discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to exist introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.
(c) In all cases, the original judgment shall be ready bated and a new judgment rendered, and the former shall not be used or referred to in evidence or argument on the new trial.
These directions portray a proceeding whereby errors of constabulary or irregularities are expunged from the record, or new bear witness is introduced, or both steps are taken. In a new trial, by the very nature of its purpose and what is to exist washed, both parties intervene. On the other hand, section seven of Rule 116 contemplates no new hearing or proceeding of any kind or modify in the tape or evidence. To alter a judgment, the courtroom alone, of its own movement and without any notice to either party, may and does generally act. This then because a simple modification of a judgement is accomplished on the basis of what is already in the record. No irregularities or omissions are involved and absolutely naught is added to or taken from what is before the courtroom. Only wrong conclusions from or wrong appreciation of the proofs already at manus are corrected in the determination.
Once again, whereas, when a motility for new trial is granted, "the original judgment shall be ready aside and a new judgment rendered, and the former shall not be used or reffered to in show or argument in the new trial" (section 5 of Rule 117), as though no judgment had been rendered, yet under section 7 of Rule 116 the integrity of the decision already handed down is unaffected, except for the proposed change, change which may consist of alteration, insertion, or elimination of a discussion, phrase, sentence or paragraph, although in that location is nothing to prevent the unabridged decision from being rewritten as was done in this example.
I other objection to a modification at any time of a judgment prejudicial to the accused is � so information technology is contended � that the accused would exist put twice in jeopardy. Our respond is that the doctrine of double jeopardy does non enter into the instance for the reason that jeopardy does not attach until the menstruum for appeal has expired. The principle of double jeopardy in this respect has not been changed by police force or the Constitution. The rule is the same now as when the Vayson case was decided; the same rule that prevails under the Constitution if the United States and the constitutions of the various States on which the decisions cited in the Vayson case are predicted. The thing relative to the time when jeopardy attaches is largely statutory, and section seven of Rule 116, in express and plain language, fixes such fourth dimension at the expiration of fifteen days. Section one of Dominion 117 for the reason already explained does not affect in whatsoever mode section 7 of Dominion 116. It is submitted that to interpret the latter provision in the lite of section 1 of Rule 117 would be virtually to annul it and violate the dominion of statutory structure that dissimilar provisions of a law must be reconciled and then far as it is possible to do so.
To summarize, judgment in a criminal example may exist revised or modified only within the period to entreatment, or fifteen days from the appointment of its promulgation. Nosotros encounter no reason why the Government may not make a motion for reconsideration as distinct from a motion for new trial, earlier the judgment becomes executory, merely such movement can not operate to suspend or extend the above period; the court must act before that menstruum terminates if the revision, alteration, or modification are to exist valid. Only a motion by the defendant can interrupt the running of the catamenia at the expiration of which the judgment becomes concluding.
The allegation in the information practice not constitute cause of action. Democracy Act No. 4 became effective on July 19, 1946, but the President, in Proclamation No. one, by virtue of the power conferred upon him act, fixed August 31, 1946, upwards to which possessor of unlicensed firearms might give up them to lawful authorities without incurring any criminal liability. The clear inference from the terms of the proclamation is that from the date of the effectivity of Commonwealth Act No. iv to August 31, 1946, the penalty for mere possession of firearms, ammunition, etc., was suspended. The only instances in which such possession was punishable before August 31, 1946, were making use of the firearms, except in self-defense, or carrying them for purposes other than surrendering them to the proper regime. (See People vs. Aquino, Yard.R. No. L-14292)
Still, this example is not earlier the states on appeal on the merit. We are requested not to review the original judgment but to declare information technology subsisting and to prepare aside the modified judgment.
The modified judgment of the lower court dated Baronial 7, 1947, will exist set aside and the original judgment declared final. This decision will exist without prejudice to whatever recourse the accused may deem available to counteract the original judgment. Without costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, and Montemayor, JJ., agree.
Bengzon and Reyes, JJ., concur in the issue.
Moran, C.J., concurs in the result but non in the reasoning of the conclusion.TUASON, J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla took part in the deliberation and concurred in this decision.
Footnotes
1 New Trial. � At whatever fourth dimension before the final entry of a judgment of conviction, the court may on movement of the defendant, or on its own motion with the consent of the defendant, grant a new trial.
two 83 Phil., p. 614.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Police Foundation
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1950/apr1950/gr_l-2233_1950.html
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